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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The defendants appeal the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Donald Orvosh, and 
against defendants on Orvosh's claim under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
SS 1001 et seq. Orvosh has also cross-appealed from the 
district court's denial of attorney fees. For the reasons that 
follow, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Orvosh. Moreover, we will affirm the 
order of the district court denying attorney's fees as we see 
no reason to reverse that denial. 
 
I. 
 
David Orvosh entered the job market with a high school 
diploma and some college credit. He worked from 1962 to 
1967 as a lab technician in Paint Research for PPG 
Industries. From 1967 to 1973 he worked first as a 
research technician in Paint Production, then as supervisor 
of a paint line for Season-All Industries. Orvosh also 
worked as a material foreman at Chrysler Corporation from 
1973 until 1977. 
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On January 7, 1977, Orvosh was hired by Volkswagen of 
America, Inc. and he stayed with the company until March, 
1987. During his time with Volkswagen, Orvosh worked in 
both the Paint Process Department and Paint Production 
Departments holding a variety of positions including senior 
chemist, senior lab engineer and general supervisor. 
 
In March of 1987, Orvosh's treating physician, Dr. Angelo 
DeMezza, diagnosed him with asbestosis,1  atelectasis,2 deep 
vein thrombophlebitis ("DVT"),3 hyperthyrodism, and right 
pleural effusion.4 A year later, Orvosh suffered a heart 
attack and was diagnosed with coronary artery disease. He 
underwent a cardiac catherization in 1989, and in 1991 a 
piece of his lung was removed due to a left pleural tumor. 
In 1994, Orvosh had a second cardiac catherization, which 
disclosed that his right coronary artery had a 100% 
blockage, and his left coronary artery had a 30% blockage. 
In addition, Orvosh suffers from Graves' disease which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Asbestosis is defined as a "lung disease caused by inhalation of 
asbestos fibers, characterized by interstitialfibrosis, and associated 
with 
mesothelioma and bronchogenic carcinoma." This and all other 
definitions of Orvosh's medical conditions were taken from the district 
court's opinion. The district court adopted definitions from a medical 
encyclopedia that Volkswagen included in its motion for summary 
judgment. Orvosh did not challenge the definitions, and indeed relies on 
the same definitions in his briefs to us. Therefore, we will rely on the 
definitions as well. 
 
2. Atelectasis is defined as "a collapsed or airless state of the lung, 
which 
may be acute or chronic, and may involve all or part of the lung." 
 
3. DVT is defined as the formulation of a thrombus, which impedes the 
flow of blood in the arteries or veins. Venous thrombosis occurs most 
often in the legs or pelvis. The symptoms of venous thrombosis -- a 
feeling of heaviness, pain, warmth, or swelling in the affected part, and 
possibly chills and fever -- do not necessarily indicate its severity. 
Immediate medical attention is necessary in any case. Treatment 
requires bed rest with the legs elevated and application of heat to the 
affected areas, and the affected part must be immobilized to prevent the 
clot from spreading, and anticoagulant drugs may be given. Immobility 
is a prime factor in the development of thrombosis; an exercise routine 
is necessary in treatment and prevention. 
 
4. Pleural effusion is defined as "an accumulation of fluid in the space 
between the membrane encasing the lung and that lining the thoracic 
cavity," threatening the collapse of the lung. 
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impairs his vision. Over time, his condition worsened and 
he also developed a pulmonary embolism.5  
 
Volkswagen paid Orvosh short-term and long-term 
disability ("LTD") benefits in accordance with its Salaried 
Group Insurance Plan which had been adopted in October, 
1977. In June, 1995, Volkswagen adopted the "Program of 
Group Insurance for Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of 
America, Inc." ("the Plan"). Both parties agree that the 1995 
plan governs this case and that it is covered by ERISA. 
 
The Plan defines "disabled" as follows: 
 
       For the first 12 months that you are receiving long 
       term benefits, `disabled' means you cannot engage in 
       your specific position at the Company. For the 
       remainder of your disability you must be unable to 
       work for any employer in a paying job for which you 
       are reasonably fitted by education, training, or 
       experience. However, you can take part in rehabilitative 
       employment and still be considered disabled. 
 
App. at R68. 
 
Benefits are payable under the Plan for a covered 
disability if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
       1. You are "disabled" (as defined by the Plan) 
 
       2. You are under a doctor's care 
 
       3. You provide required proof of your disability 
 
       4. You submit to an examination by an impartial 
       doctor, at the company's expense, if requested. The 
       results of this examination will determine whether 
       or not you receive or continue to receive disability 
       benefits. 
 
Id. 
 
The Plan further provides that: 
 
       Long-Term Disability benefits start on the day after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Pulmonary embolisms occur when an embolus or blood clot detaches 
itself from a vein in the leg or pelvis and blocks the pulmonary artery or 
one of its branches. 
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       Short-Term Disability benefits stop. These benefits can 
       continue through the end of the month in which you 
       attain age 65, provided your Long-Term disability 
       benefits began before age 60, and you are certified by 
       your physician as being totally disabled. 
 
Id. at R69. 
 
Volkswagen concluded that Orvosh met all prerequisites 
for LTD benefits, and it paid those benefits for ten years 
without dispute. During that time, Dr. DeMezza repeatedly 
certified that Orvosh was totally disabled, and he identified 
several of Orvosh's disabling conditions including: DVT, 
chest pain, and asbestosis. 
 
In 1995, Volkswagen changed the administrator of its 
LTD benefits from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to 
UNUM Life Insurance Company of America. UNUM reviewed 
Orvosh's claim shortly after the change. In August of 1995, 
UNUM received copies of Orvosh's medical records and 
asked Dr. DeMezza to complete a questionnaire regarding 
Orvosh's condition. Pursuant to that inquiry, Dr. DeMezza 
told UNUM that Orvosh's diagnosis included 
arteriosclerosis, heart disease, recurrent pulled groin, and 
DVT. Dr. De Mezza further indicated that Orvosh was being 
treated with medication and that the prognosis for his 
return to gainful employment was "bleak" because of 
dyspnea.6 
 
UNUM then had its own physician, Dr. Charles Perakis, 
review Orvosh's medical history. Dr. Perakis concluded that 
Orvosh's pulmonary function appeared to be adequate for 
sedentary work but that reevaluation of his coronary artery 
disease was necessary to assess his true functioning 
status. 
 
On January 10, 1996, UNUM forwarded a follow-up 
questionnaire to Dr. DeMezza. Dr. DeMezza responded that 
the only symptom causing impairment was "difficulty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Dyspnea is a condition of difficult or painful breathing due to 
inadequate ventilation or insufficient amounts of oxygen circulating in 
the blood. People suffering from this condition cannot get enough oxygen 
in the blood, and oxygen therapy is required. 
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breathing with exertion," but that in his opinion, Orvosh 
was unable to work in any type of gainful employment. 
 
UNUM interviewed Orvosh in early 1996. During that 
interview, Orvosh reported that he did housework including 
cleaning dishes and making dinner. He also reported an 
ability to perform various house cleaning tasks. Orvosh also 
reported that he engaged in various recreational activities 
including hunting and walking his dog. Finally, Orvosh 
reported that he drove his wife home from work every day, 
but that his wife drove herself to work because Orvosh 
experienced double vision upon waking in the morning. 
 
Also in January, 1996, Jackie Roberts, an UNUM 
Disability Benefits Specialist, submitted a Regional 
Consulting Physician Referral Sheet to Mary Hearn, an 
UNUM Registered Nurse, asking Hearn to assess Orvosh's 
claim. After reviewing Orvosh's entire file, Hearn concluded 
that although the medical information was insufficient to 
determine the severity of his cardiac status, Orvosh 
appeared to have the capacity for sedentary to light work. 
 
Sometime after Hearn reviewed Orvosh's file, Roberts 
requested that Triebold & Associates perform a Transferable 
Skills Assessment ("TSA") to determine whether Orvosh had 
the functional capacity to perform sedentary work. 
However, UNUM did not give Triebold a complete picture of 
Orvosh's health. Rather, UNUM told Triebold only that 
Orvosh suffered from asbestosis. Triebold reviewed Orvosh's 
work history, educational background, and personal data to 
prepare the TSA. Triebold assumed "for the purposes of this 
assessment . . . a functional capacity for work at the 
sedentary level of physical exertion." App. at R200. Triebold 
concluded that Orvosh's past highly skilled work"would 
not provide him with transferable skills for work at the 
sedentary level of physical exertion given his over 9 years 
absence from the work force at age 57." App. at R200-1. 
However, Triebold suggested that "retirement type 
positions" such as gate attendant, surveillance system 
monitor, and information clerk would be appropriate for 
Orvosh, given his health. According to the TSA, such 
retirement type positions, 
 
       would utilize Mr. Orvosh's basic work skills that he 
       gained from performing his past work [including] his 
 
                                6 
  
       ability to perform simple to complex tasks within a 
       schedule and without special supervision, interact 
       appropriately with co-workers and supervisors, adhere 
       to company procedures and safety policies, etc. 
 
App. at R201. 
 
Based on the TSA and other information gathered during 
the investigation, UNUM recommended that Volkswagen 
terminate Orvosh's LTD benefits. However, Volkswagen did 
not immediately act on that recommendation. Instead 
Volkswagen instructed UNUM to obtain an independent 
medical exam ("IME") to confirm that termination of those 
benefits was appropriate. Pursuant to that request, UNUM 
sought recommendations for appropriate testing through a 
Regional Consulting Physician Referral Form. 
 
On September 23, 1996, UNUM sent Dr. DeMezza a copy 
of the TSA and asked him whether he agreed with its 
conclusion that Orvosh was capable of performing in 
"retirement type positions." Dr. DeMezza disagreed with the 
TSA and advised UNUM that sedentary work of any kind 
was contraindicated because of recurrent episodes of DVT 
and pulmonary embolism. Dr. DeMezza also stated that 
Orvosh could not have periods of prolonged sitting without 
movement. 
 
In November, 1996, UNUM contacted Dr. Seymoure 
Krause, a cardiac specialist, and asked him to conduct an 
IME. Krause reviewed Orvosh's medical history, evaluated 
his physical capabilities, and tested his functional capacity 
by means of a thallium stress test which measures heart 
rate at the peak of stress. Krause issued a report in which 
he noted that Orvosh's chest discomfort and dyspnea were 
more likely related to pulmonary disease and thoracotomy 
than coronary heart disease. Krause recommended that 
Orvosh "have pulmonary function tests and also obtain an 
opinion from a pulmonary specialist." App. at R253. As part 
of his report, Dr. Krause also filled out a physical 
capabilities evaluation form. Krause answered an inquiry 
into Orvosh's ability to work that was contained on that 
form by stating: "it depends on the job assignment." App. at 
R254.1. Dr. Krause opined that in an eight hour work day, 
with rest, Orvosh could sit for up to six hours, stand for up 
to six hours, and walk for up to one hour. 
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Several of UNUM's doctors and nurses reviewed the 
results of the IME and concluded that Orvosh could work 
at a sedentary job. Similarly, after reviewing the IME, 
Triebold concluded that Orvosh could perform any of the 
"retirement type positions" previously referred to as well as 
"numerous additional occupations." App. at R307-8. Dr. 
DeMezza received a copy of both the IME report and 
Triebold's most recent report for review. However, he 
remained unpersuaded and maintained his opinion that 
Orvosh was totally disabled. 
 
Nevertheless, despite Dr. DeMezza's opinion to the 
contrary, UNUM concluded that Orvosh was not "totally 
disabled" under the Plan, and advised Orvosh that his LTD 
benefits would be terminated. Orvosh filed an unsuccessful 
administrative appeal of that decision, and then sued 
Volkswagen in state court seeking reinstatement of his LTD 
benefits. Volkswagen removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
because it arose under federal law. 
 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court held that Volkswagen's decision to terminate Orvosh's 
benefits was arbitrary and capricious and ordered 
Volkswagen to reinstate Orvosh's benefits retroactive to the 
date of termination. The court also considered, but denied, 
a motion for attorney's fees Orvosh filed as a prevailing 
party pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 1132 (g)(1). Volkswagen's 
appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment 
and Orvosh's cross-appeal of the court's denial of attorney's 
fees are now before us. 
 
II. 
 
When we review a grant of summary judgment we must 
apply the same test as the district court. See Carter v. 
Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1304 (3d Cir. 1987). Namely, 
summary judgment is only appropriate when "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We exercise "plenary review over 
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the trial court's choice and interpretation of legal precepts 
and its application of those precepts to the historical facts." 
Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp. , 13 F.3d 
762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
In reviewing a denial of benefits under an ERISA plan, we 
must first determine the extent to which the plan 
administrator has discretion to interpret the Plan. If the 
Plan grants the administrator the authority to determine 
eligibility, we review a denial of benefits under an "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard. Under that standard, a plan 
administrator's decision will be overturned only if it is 
"clearly not supported by the evidence in the record or the 
administrator has failed to comply with the procedures 
required by the plan." Abnathya v. Hoffman- La Roche, Inc., 
2 F.3d 40, 41 (3d Cir. 1993). " `[A] court is not free to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the defendants in 
determining eligibility for plan benefits.' " Id. at 45 (quoting 
Lucash v. Strick Corp., 602 F.Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Pa. 
1984). Here, the Plan vests the administrator with the 
authority to "interpret the plan and make final decisions on 
such things as eligibility and payment of benefits," App. at 
R90, and we must therefore undertake a deferential review. 
Moreover, the parties have stipulated that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard governs our inquiry. See Stip. P 2 at 
App. at R58.7 
 
III. 
 
Thus, our inquiry turns on whether defendants were 
arbitrary and capricious in their interpretation of the Plan's 
LTD requirement. Under that requirement Orvosh was not 
eligible for LTD benefits unless he was unable to perform in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. After this case was argued, we decided that a heightened standard of 
review applies where the same entity both funds and administers an 
ERISA plan. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard life Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 
2000 WL 696383 (3d Cir. May 31, 2000). Here, UNUM provides 
important administrative functions, but the Plan itself states that the 
official Plan administrator is "Volkswagen of America Inc." App. at R90. 
However, valid stipulations entered into freely and fairly should not be 
lightly set aside. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 616 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Thus, we will apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 
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a position for which he was "reasonably fitted by education, 
training, or experience." As noted above, while at 
Volkswagen, Orvosh worked as a senior chemist and a 
senior lab engineer in the Paint Process Department, and 
as a general supervisor in the Paint Production 
Department. Even though several ailments prevented 
Orvosh from performing any of those jobs, the Plan 
Administrator concluded that he was no longer totally 
disabled because subsequent medical evaluations found 
him capable of working as a gate attendant, surveillance 
system monitor, information clerk; or performing similar 
"retirement type" jobs. Given the totality of circumstances 
here, we can not conclude that Volkswagen was arbitrary 
and capricious in concluding either that Orvosh was 
capable of performing the duties required by such 
positions, or that the positions provided a reasonable fit 
with Orvosh's training, education, and experience. 
 
Volkswagen argues that its assessment of Orvosh's ability 
to work was substantially supported by the evidence. 
Several physicians and health care workers reviewed 
Orvosh's medical history. They provided Orvosh's treating 
physician with copies of the assessments and solicited his 
opinion as to whether Orvosh was capable of working. 
Although Dr. DeMezza constantly and continually 
expressed his disagreement with Volkswagen's 
determination that Orvosh could perform sedentary 
"retirement type" employment, that doesn't negate the fact 
that Volkswagen solicited Dr. DeMezza's opinion as part of 
its inquiry into Orvosh's capacity to work.8 Volkswagen 
therefore argues that its decision not to continue paying 
benefits cannot be arbitrary and capricious because of the 
quantity and quality of its inquiry. 
 
Orvosh essentially argues that the investigation is 
irrelevant. He asserts that, under the plain language of the 
Plan, once long term disability benefits are established, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We do not intend to suggest that an employer or plan administrator 
can insulate its decision to deny benefits merely by asking an employee's 
treating physician for his/her opinion. A pro forma request for such an 
opinion will not camouflage a denial of benefits that is otherwise 
arbitrary and capricious. 
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they cannot be terminated unless an impartial doctor 
examines the patient/employee and determines that the 
individual is capable of working at a job for which he or she 
is reasonably suited. It is true that neither the TSA nor the 
assessments by UNUM physicians were conducted by an 
impartial physician. However, Orvosh was also examined by 
Dr. Seymoure Krause, and his impartiality is not 
challenged. 
 
As noted above, Krause concluded that Orvosh could: sit 
or stand for six hours during an eight hour workday with 
rest, walk for one hour with rest, lift up to twenty pounds 
for up to 1/3 of the day; and bend, stoop, squat, kneel, 
climb stairs, crawl, reach above his shoulders, and walk on 
uneven surfaces for up to 1/3 of the day. Dr. Krause also 
reported that Orvosh's manual dexterity appeared good and 
that there were no other potential environmental 
restrictions which Orvosh's medical condition would 
require. When asked whether Orvosh could work, Krause 
responded, "it depends on the job assignment." App. at 
R254.1. Although it can be argued that Dr. Krause's 
response was so equivocal as to be of little use, it can not 
be successfully argued that Krause's evaluation confirmed 
that Orvosh was incapable of working at all, or that it was 
arbitrary and capricious for Volkswagen to rely on Krause's 
report. 
 
Dr. Krause did qualify his conclusions by stating that 
Orvosh's chest discomfort and dyspnea were more likely 
related to pulmonary disease and his thoracotomy rather 
than his coronary heart disease, and Krause recommended 
that Orvosh "have pulmonary function tests and also obtain 
an opinion from a pulmonary specialist." App. at R253. We 
realize that, despite Dr. Krause' recommendation, 
Volkswagen did not consult a pulmonary specialist. 
 
Volkswagen decided against ordering a second IME 
directed at Orvosh's pulmonary condition. Instead, it relied 
upon Orvosh's lifestyle, medical history, and the initial IME 
to conclude in essence that no matter what his precise 
pulmonary condition, it was not consistent with afinding of 
total disability. For example, on May 23, 1997, Dr. Feagin, 
a UNUM physician, reviewed Orvosh's file, specifically 
addressing his pulmonary and vascular conditions. Dr. 
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Feagin concluded that test results showed Orvosh to have 
"no significant pulmonary DVT or peripheral vascular 
disease impairment for at least medium work." App. at 
R322. Dr. Feagin's conclusions were also supported by 
Anne Giradot, a UNUM registered nurse, and Orvosh's 
chest X-rays which revealed only a modest degree of 
pulmonary emphysema. 
 
Thus, Volkswagen's decision to terminate Orvosh's long 
term benefits was clearly consistent with the weight of the 
medical information available to it, and we can not 
conclude that Volkswagen's decision, or UNUM's 
recommendation, was arbitrary or capricious. Volkswagen 
considered Orvosh's overall medical condition and his well 
documented medical history before deciding that he was 
capable of performing the duties of a sedentary, retirement 
job such as a gate attendant, surveillance system monitor 
or information clerk. Moreover, it is important to note that 
Volkswagen continued to pay Orvosh while it investigated 
his medical condition. There was no rush to cut off the 
payments that Volkswagen had been making for over 10 
years. Accordingly, we can not agree that the decision to 
terminate Orvosh's benefits was arbitrary and capricious. 
 
The more difficult question before us is whether these 
"retirement-type positions" are reasonably suited to 
Orvosh's education, training, and experience. In arguing 
that they are, Volkswagen relies in part upon Buchanan v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 5 F.Supp.2d 1172 (D.Kan. 
1998) and Brooks v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 883 F.Supp. 
632 (M.D.Ala. 1995), aff 'd 77 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 
The plaintiff in Buchanan was a machinist who lost an 
eye while working on a fireworks display. Under his 
employer's disability plan, "Permanent Total Disability" 
meant that the participant was "not able to perform the 
duties of any occupation for which he is suited by 
education, training or experience." Buchanan , 5 F.Supp.2d 
at 1174. The defendant insurance company performed a 
TSA and concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled 
under the plan because he could perform other jobs within 
the company even though he could no longer work as a 
machinist. Id. at 1176. Upon review, the court concluded 
that the decision to deny total disability coverage was not 
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arbitrary and capricious even though plaintiff would need 
additional training to perform some of the suggested jobs. 
Id. at 1184-5. The court found that the language of the 
plan did not require an "exact fit" with the employee's 
background, but was merely intended to ensure that the 
employee had the "minimum education or experience to 
perform the job. For example, the defendant could not avoid 
payment by insisting that plaintiff 's eye problems would 
not disqualify him from being the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court." Id. at 1185. 
 
The plan at issue in Brooks defined an individual as 
disabled if he/she was "unable to engage in any business 
or occupation or to perform any work for compensation, 
gain or profit for which he[/she] is reasonably fitted by 
education, training, or experience." Brooks , 883 F.Supp. at 
634, n.1. The court upheld the administrator's decision to 
terminate benefits because Brooks, a power company 
lineman prior to his injury, could reasonably work as a 
meter reader. The court concluded that the administrator 
was under no "legal duty to concern itself with the 
occupational position for which Brooks was best-suited." Id. 
at 640. See also Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1307 
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding plaintiff not totally disabled 
because although no longer able to perform his former 
occupation as a truck driver, he remained both capable and 
"qualified by training, education, or experience" to complete 
sedentary to light work). 
 
The defendants urge us to adopt the analysis of Brooks, 
Buchanan and Duhon. They argue that we should conclude 
that the language of the Plan is intended to ensure only 
that an employee has the minimum qualifications for the 
suggested jobs. 
 
Given the deference that must be afforded here, we need 
not agree with the administrator's interpretation of a 
"reasonable fit." We need only determine that its 
interpretation is not contrary to the Plan language and that 
it is rationally related to a legitimate Plan purpose. 
Volkswagen's interpretation easily survives both inquiries. 
It appears that, although Orvosh is no longer able to fulfill 
the duties of his former job, he is capable of securing other 
gainful employment for which he is reasonably suited. The 
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administrator's conclusion is thus not contrary to the plain 
language of the Plan and it clearly is rationally related to 
the legitimate purpose of preserving the Plan's resources for 
legitimately disabled claimants. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Orvosh, and its 
judgment will therefore be reversed. Further, we hold that 
Volkswagen did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in 
discontinuing total disability benefits, and we will therefore 
order that summary judgment be entered in favor of the 
defendants. 
 
IV. 
 
Orvosh cross-appeals the district court's decision to deny 
him attorney fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g). 
Obviously, we need not dwell on this point given our 
reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
See Noorily v. Thomas and Betts Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 162 
(3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1555 
(2000). 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Orvosh, and 
remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants. Consequently, we will affirm the 
district court's denial of attorney's fees. 
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